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1Effective May 31, 2006, Judge Roth assumed senior status.
                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT








Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-00871)
District Judge:  Legrome D. Davis
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 1, 2006
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO and ROTH1,  Circuit Judges.
 
(Filed:  June 6, 2006)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Heartman St. Croix, filed a complaint and an amendment to the
complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
2seeking damages against defendant, Mike Etenad, for the manner in which Etenad
conducted certain personal financial transactions with appellant.  The District Court
concluded that St. Croix failed to identify a basis for its subject matter jurisdiction in
either the complaint or the amendment.  Likewise, although there was some suggestion in
St. Croix’s memorandum in response to the court’s show cause order that appellant was
seeking to advance claims under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §
1983, the District Court concluded that St. Croix failed to mention either of those claims
in his complaint or amendment, nor did appellant allege the factual predicate of such
claims in any of his filings.  The District Court further determined that, even assuming
arguendo that those claims had been raised, St. Croix failed to assert the factual
allegations necessary to state a cause of action under either statute.  Thus, the court
dismissed the claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that St. Croix was attempting to
advance, and entered an order dismissing the action.  This timely appeal followed.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary
review over a District Court’s order dismissing a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.  See Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir.2005).  After
careful scrutiny of the record and appellant’s informal brief, we agree that the District
Court lacked subject jurisdiction over St. Croix’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1332(a), and that, in any event, appellant’s purported claims – unsupported by the
necessary factual allegations – fell woefully short of that necessary to state a claim under
3either the Sherman Act or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even with the most liberal construction.  See,
e.g., American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999) (Plaintiff
asserting §1983 action must establish that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed
under color of state law.  The “under-color-of-state-law element of §1983 excludes from
its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.”(internal
quotation marks omitted));  McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S.
232, 242 (1980) (“[J]urisdiction may not be invoked under [the Sherman Act] unless the
relevant aspect of interstate commerce is identified; it is not sufficient merely to rely on
identification of a relevant local activity and to presume an interrelationship with some
unspecified aspect of interstate commerce.  To establish jurisdiction a plaintiff must
allege the critical relationship....”); Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir.
2004) (“Although antitrust claims generally are not subject to the heightened pleading
requirement of Rule 9(b), fraud must be pled with particularity....”).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s final order of dismissal.
